Sobre responsabilidade civil e criminal no projeto visando confiabilidade humana
Na sexta passada, em que discutimos os acidentes, ficou evidente que grande parte dos erros cometidos pelos operadores foi provocada por deficiências no projeto. Como projetistas de sistemas, precisamos ficar atentos às nossas responsabilidades e às possíveis imputações legais decorrentes das decisões de projeto.
Ações judiciais de responsabilidade civil e criminal são um prejuízo à cultura de segurança das empresas e podem representar um atraso às pesquisas na área de confiabilidade humana; por outro lado, elas despertam nos projetistas a consciência da importância da confiabilidade humana nos projetos de engenharia.
O texto a seguir foi publicado na lista do AirSafetyGroup e fala sobre responsabilidade no acidente do Concorde.
A good example of how many people and of how large a range may get involved after an air accident 5 years after the accident that costed all the lives of the CONCORDE disaster on take-off , the french judge accuses the top engineer. As it was revealed , the weak point of the CONCORDE wing structure was too well known years ago : the soft wing cover would not stand the impact of pieces of blown up tyres and therefore the fuel tanks found at this point were not protected. The solution was a KEVLAR shield and/or tyres that will not explode .
To no surprise of course (!) it was considered on those days that a possible grounding at large scale for the CONCORDE would affect badly its reputation and 'eventually' the decision makers relied on the showlders of 'statistics' : it was a rare thing to happen . True , you may say a 0,1 % . However , for a thing that will be repeated so often , the possibility of 1 becomes a certainty , and so the disaster did happen .
The judge makes the point that despite the time intervened from the day the problem became known , eversince , NOTHING has been modified !
This proves that one can not really have a tranquil sleep years after some safety details have been 'neglected'. Not all judges everywhere will be proven equally sensitive of course ( I bet you ) but once the first example appeared there is a tendency for others to immitate them
That reminds me that some local ATC procedures found for a long time in the 'grey area' and where no one ( traditionally ) wants to bring some clarification , may challenge the statistics as well. Can you imagine , say , some retired supervisors be called in front of the judge for having not reacted on something 'abnormal' some ...20 years ago in their carreer ?
Interesting , eh ?
Ações judiciais de responsabilidade civil e criminal são um prejuízo à cultura de segurança das empresas e podem representar um atraso às pesquisas na área de confiabilidade humana; por outro lado, elas despertam nos projetistas a consciência da importância da confiabilidade humana nos projetos de engenharia.
O texto a seguir foi publicado na lista do AirSafetyGroup e fala sobre responsabilidade no acidente do Concorde.
A good example of how many people and of how large a range may get involved after an air accident 5 years after the accident that costed all the lives of the CONCORDE disaster on take-off , the french judge accuses the top engineer. As it was revealed , the weak point of the CONCORDE wing structure was too well known years ago : the soft wing cover would not stand the impact of pieces of blown up tyres and therefore the fuel tanks found at this point were not protected. The solution was a KEVLAR shield and/or tyres that will not explode .
To no surprise of course (!) it was considered on those days that a possible grounding at large scale for the CONCORDE would affect badly its reputation and 'eventually' the decision makers relied on the showlders of 'statistics' : it was a rare thing to happen . True , you may say a 0,1 % . However , for a thing that will be repeated so often , the possibility of 1 becomes a certainty , and so the disaster did happen .
The judge makes the point that despite the time intervened from the day the problem became known , eversince , NOTHING has been modified !
This proves that one can not really have a tranquil sleep years after some safety details have been 'neglected'. Not all judges everywhere will be proven equally sensitive of course ( I bet you ) but once the first example appeared there is a tendency for others to immitate them
That reminds me that some local ATC procedures found for a long time in the 'grey area' and where no one ( traditionally ) wants to bring some clarification , may challenge the statistics as well. Can you imagine , say , some retired supervisors be called in front of the judge for having not reacted on something 'abnormal' some ...20 years ago in their carreer ?
Interesting , eh ?
posted by Lucia at
8:26 AM
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